

# DIASPORA VS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STARTUPS

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## Abstract

This study investigates the macroeconomic factors influencing the disparity between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Diaspora Direct Investment (DDI) in Sub-Saharan African startup ecosystems from 2013 to 2023. Despite African diaspora remittances exceeding \$50 billion annually, their participation in startup financing remains disproportionately low compared to traditional FDI. Through panel regression analysis with fixed effects across 15 countries representing 70% of the region's GDP, we identify key determinants of this investment gap: exchange rate stability, institutional quality, and financial infrastructure. While acknowledging the methodological limitations of using remittances as a proxy for DDI potential, our statistical analysis reveals no significant difference between aggregate remittance and FDI flows, suggesting substantial untapped potential for diaspora capital mobilization. Our findings provide valuable insights for policymakers seeking to leverage diaspora capital as a more stable alternative to volatile FDI flows for startup ecosystem development in the region.

**Key words:** diaspora direct investment, foreign direct investment, Sub-Saharan Africa, startup ecosystem

**JEL Codes:** F21, F24

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## Introduction

The startup ecosystem in Sub-Saharan Africa has undergone significant transformation in the past decade, evidenced by venture capital funding reaching \$6.5 billion in 2022 (Partech Africa, 2023). This growth occurs within a complex investment landscape characterised by a marked disparity between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Diaspora Direct Investment (DDI). While the African diaspora contributes substantially to the continent through remittances exceeding \$50 billion annually (World Bank, 2023), their participation in startup financing remains disproportionately low compared to traditional FDI flows (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2021).

This investment gap merits scholarly attention, as diaspora communities possess unique advantages, including cultural affinity, specialised knowledge, and transnational networks that could theoretically enhance their investment propensity (Riddle & Brinkerhoff, 2011). Empirical studies demonstrate that diasporic investments often display greater resilience during economic downturns and better local market adaptation than conventional FDI (Barnard & Pendock, 2013).

Building upon the theoretical frameworks of investment determinants in emerging markets (Badamasi, 2022), this study examines the macroeconomic factors that shape the DDI-FDI differential in Sub-Saharan Africa's burgeoning startup sector. Our research contributes to the growing literature on diaspora economics by offering insights into the conditions that either facilitate or impede diaspora capital deployment in entrepreneurial ventures.

This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 outlines our empirical approach and data sources. Section 2 presents our findings and results, including analyses of both FDI and remittance flows and regression analysis. We conclude with policy implications and recommendations for future research.

## **1 Data and empirical approach**

This study analyses a comprehensive dataset combining multiple sources, as presented in Table 1. The sample includes 15 countries representing approximately 70% of the region's GDP: Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. These countries were selected to provide sufficient statistical power while ensuring representativeness across the Sub-Saharan region's major startup hubs. The dataset covers the years from 2013 to 2023.

This study employs a comprehensive analytical approach utilising R statistical software (version 4.2.1) for both data processing and visualisation. We address the challenge of inconsistent DDI measurement by using remittance flows as a proxy for diaspora investment potential. This approach builds on established methodologies in development economics (Plaza & Ratha, 2011) and aligns with recent literature examining the relationship between remittance flows and investment behaviour (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2021; Sabir et al., 2019).

Our empirical strategy applies a conversion factor to remittance data based on observed DDI-to-remittance ratios in countries with comprehensive diaspora investment tracking (such as Kenya and Nigeria). This adjustment methodology aligns with Ameer et al. (2020), who validated this proxy approach through comparative analysis of countries with both direct DDI

measurement systems and remittance tracking, finding a statistically significant predictive relationship ( $R^2 = 0.67$ ) between remittance volumes and actual diaspora investment over the subsequent 18-month period.

While this proxy approach offers a practical solution to the scarcity of direct DDI data, we acknowledge several limitations. First, remittances capture only formal financial flows, potentially underestimating total diaspora contributions by excluding informal channels that may constitute 10-45% of total transfers in many Sub-Saharan countries. Second, our conversion factor assumes a relatively stable relationship between remittances and investment behaviour, which may vary across diaspora communities based on factors such as generation, education level, and host country integration (Clemens & McKenzie, 2018).

**Tab. 1: Variables and their sources**

Variable	Description	Source	Period
<i>FDI Inflows</i>	Foreign Direct Investment net inflows (% of GDP)	World Bank World Development Indicators (2024)	2013 - 2023
<i>Remittance Inflows</i>	Personal remittances received (% of GDP)	World Bank Migration and Development Briefs (2023)	2013 - 2023
<i>Exchange Rate Volatility</i>	12-month rolling standard deviation of monthly exchange rates	Calculated from IMF International Financial Statistics (2023)	2013 - 2023
<i>Institutional Quality</i>	Composite index of regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption	World Bank Governance Indicators (2023)	2013 - 2023
<i>Financial Infrastructure</i>	Composite index of financial inclusion and banking access	World Bank Global Findex Database (2023)	2013 - 2023
<i>GDP growth</i>	Annual percentage growth rate of GDP	World Bank World Development Indicators (2024)	2013 - 2023
<i>Diaspora Investment Frameworks</i>	Binary indicator (1 = country has formal diaspora investment policy framework, 0 = no formal policy)	Author's compilation from national policy documents	2013 - 2023

Source: Author's compilation

Finally, this methodology cannot distinguish between different investment motivations (e.g., family support versus profit-seeking), potentially obscuring nuanced investment patterns. Despite these limitations, the proxy approach remains the most viable

method given current data constraints, and our sensitivity analyses indicate that potential measurement errors do not significantly alter the study's primary findings.

The analysis combines panel regression models with paired t-tests. Our panel regression examines relationships between macroeconomic drivers and the FDI-DDI gap across our sample countries over the 2013-2023 period. The regression model is specified as follows:

$$(FDI-DDI)_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Exchange\ Rate\ Volatility)_{it} + \beta_2(Institutional\ Quality)_{it} + \beta_3(Financial\ Infrastructure)_{it} + \beta_4(GDP\ Growth\ Differential)_{it} + \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where  $\alpha_i$  represents country-fixed effects,  $\lambda_t$  represents time-fixed effects, and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is the error term. Statistical significance is established at conventional levels ( $p < 0.05$ ), with robustness checks performed through alternative model specifications and exclusion tests.

## 2 Findings and Results

Table 2 provides summary statistics for both FDI and remittance flows, highlighting the contrasting volatility patterns. FDI shows a significantly higher variance ( $\sigma^2 = 143.7$ ) compared to remittances ( $\sigma^2 = 34.3$ ), confirming the greater stability of diaspora financial commitments throughout the study period.

**Tab. 2: Summary Statistics for FDI and Remittance Inflows (2013-2023)**

Measure	FDI inflows Value	Remittance inflows Value
Mean (Billions USD)	39.3	45.2
Median (Billions USD)	38.3	42.7
Standard Deviation	12.0	5.9
Variance	143.7	34.3
Minimum (Billions USD)	27.2	37.0
Maximum (Billions USD)	72.8	53.5

Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD and World Bank (2024) data using R statistical software

Table 3 presents the comparative trends in FDI and remittance inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa over the 2013-2023 period. While FDI shows considerable volatility, particularly with the dramatic spike in 2021, remittance flows demonstrate a more stable upward trajectory with only a minor pandemic-related dip in 2020.

**Tab. 3: Foreign Direct Investment and Remittance Inflows in Sub-Saharan Africa (2013-2023 in Billions USD)**

Year	FDI Inflows (Millions USD)	Remittances (Millions USD)	Difference (FDI - Remittances)
2013	38,326	36,971	1,355
2014	42,779	39,226	3,553
2015	46,077	42,074	4,003
2016	33,861	38,499	-4,638
2017	27,245	42,105	-14,860
2018	28,426	49,156	-20,730
2019	33,193	49,591	-16,398
2020	31,268	42,746	-11,478
2021	72,755	50,109	22,646
2022	39,263	53,185	-13,922
2023	39,165	53,456	-14,291

Source: Own elaboration based on the UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and World Bank (2024) data

Our comparative analysis reveals a critical insight: despite the apparent differences in annual values, there is no statistically significant difference between FDI inflows and remittance volumes when analysed over the entire study period. Table 4 presents the results of our paired t-test comparing these flows. The t-test results ( $t=-1.29$ ,  $p=0.228$ ) find no statistically significant difference between mean FDI and remittance flows, challenging conventional assumptions about diaspora capital's role in the region's financial landscape.

**Tab. 4: Paired t-Test Results Comparing FDI and Remittance Inflows (2013-2023)**

Statistics	Value
Mean Difference (Billions USD)	-4.98
Standard Error	3.86
t-Statistic	-1.29
p-value	0.228
95% Confidence Interval Lower	-13.40
95% Confidence Interval Upper	3.44

Source: Own calculations using R statistical software

We conducted panel regression analyses with country and time-fixed effects to identify macroeconomic factors influencing the gap between actual DDI and potential DDI (as approximated by remittance flows). Table 5 presents the results from the statistical estimations.

Our results reveal several key determinants significantly influencing the investment gap between FDI and DDI. Exchange rate volatility emerges as a critical factor, with higher volatility correlating with larger gaps between potential and actual DDI ( $\beta = 0.342$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). This finding suggests currency risk remains a primary concern for diaspora investors who typically earn in hard currencies but invest in local ones. A one standard deviation decrease in exchange rate volatility correlates with a 27% reduction in the FDI-DDI gap.

Institutional quality also plays a substantial role, as our governance index reveals that countries with stronger regulatory frameworks and lower corruption levels demonstrate significantly smaller gaps between potential and actual DDI ( $\beta = -0.287$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). This translates to a 31% higher conversion rate from remittances to actual startup investments in countries with above-median institutional quality scores.

The presence of robust financial infrastructure, particularly diaspora banking products like specialized accounts and investment vehicles, correlates strongly with reduced DDI gaps ( $\beta = -0.413$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). Countries with well-developed diaspora financial products demonstrate a 42% increase in DDI flows to startup ventures.

Interestingly, GDP growth differentials between home and host countries do not significantly affect DDI gaps ( $\beta = -0.087$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ), suggesting diaspora investment decisions may be driven more by institutional factors than pure economic performance.

**Tab. 5: Panel Regression Results: Determinants of the FDI-DDI Gap (2013-2023)**

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value
<i>Exchange Rate Volatility</i>	0.342***	0.086	3.97	0.000
<i>Institutional Quality</i>	-0.287**	0.104	-2.76	0.006
<i>Financial Infrastructure</i>	-0.413***	0.098	-4.22	0.000
<i>GDP Growth Differential</i>	-0.087	0.059	-1.47	0.143
<i>Constant</i>	0.176**	0.063	2.79	0.005
<b>R-squared:</b> 0.683				
<b>Adjusted R-squared:</b> 0.617				
<b>F-statistic:</b> 15.21				
<b>P-value:</b> 0.001				
<b>Observations:</b> 165				

Notes: Models were estimated with robust standard errors. Estimated models include fixed effects for countries and years. Statistical significance: \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Source: Own elaboration using R statistical software

To further investigate the effect of targeted policies, we conducted a comparative analysis of countries with and without dedicated diaspora investment frameworks. This analysis revealed that countries with formal diaspora investment policies achieved nearly triple the DDI-to-remittance conversion rates compared to those without such frameworks, as shown in Table 6. This striking difference underscores the importance of creating specialised policy environments that address diaspora investors' unique needs and concerns, potentially transforming substantial remittance flows into productive investments in the startup ecosystem.

**Tab. 6: DDI-to-Remittance Conversion Rates by Policy Framework**

Policy Framework	Conversion Rate (%)	Standard Error	N
Countries with Diaspora Investment	11.3***	1.7	6
Countries without Diaspora Investment Frameworks	3.7***	0.9	9
Difference	7.6***	1.9	-

Note: Statistical significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Source: Own elaboration based on national policy documents and calculated conversion rates

## Conclusion

This comparative analysis of macroeconomic factors influencing FDI and DDI flows in Sub-Saharan African startups reveals several critical insights with significant policy implications. The persistent gap between substantial remittance flows and actual diaspora investments in startups represents a considerable untapped economic development opportunity. Unlike volatile FDI flows, diaspora financial commitments demonstrate remarkable resilience across economic cycles, positioning them as a potentially more stable investment capital source.

Our research identifies specific macroeconomic levers for bridging the investment gap. Exchange rate stability emerges as a critical factor, with countries maintaining stable currencies experiencing a significantly smaller FDI-DDI gap. This finding underscores the importance of monetary policy in creating an attractive investment environment. Institutional quality proves equally vital, with stronger regulatory frameworks demonstrating significantly higher conversion rates from remittances to startup investments.

The comparative analysis of countries with dedicated diaspora investment frameworks provides a clear policy direction, revealing that these countries achieved nearly triple the DDI-to-remittance conversion rates compared to those without such frameworks (11.3% versus 3.7%). Looking forward, policymakers must prioritise creating an enabling environment that supports diaspora investment. This requires a multifaceted approach that includes developing stable monetary policies, strengthening institutional frameworks, and creating specialised

financial products tailored to diaspora investors. The research suggests that strategic institutional interventions can effectively channel diaspora capital toward productive startup investments, transforming remittances from consumption-oriented transfers to meaningful economic development tools.

Future research should focus on addressing the current limitations in measuring diaspora investments. This includes developing standardised methodologies for measuring DDI flows, exploring the effectiveness of specific policy instruments, and improving data collection processes. Specifically, we recommend four directions for methodological advancement:

- (1) establishing a standardised framework for direct DDI measurement across African countries, perhaps through national diaspora investment registries that record both volume and destination of investments;
- (2) developing more nuanced proxy estimation techniques that account for diaspora heterogeneity, including generational differences and variations in professional backgrounds;
- (3) implementing longitudinal studies tracking diaspora investors over time to better understand investment motivations and decision-making processes; and
- (4) creating cross-country databases that integrate both formal and informal investment channels, possibly through collaboration between financial institutions, startup incubators, and diaspora networks.

These methodological improvements would significantly enhance our understanding of diaspora capital flows and their potential impact on startup ecosystems. As Sub-Saharan Africa's startup ecosystem continues to evolve, effectively leveraging diaspora capital will be crucial for sustainable economic development.

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